administrative legal protections-at least in practice. The quasi-judicial nature of the procedure requires management to act with regard for due process, under statute and at common law.
However, because the process is often administered by untrained or unqualified managers or human resources advisors, the proceedings are often conducted haphazardly and in violation of the grievant's rights. The result is both clear and appalling: Not only is the grievance system ineffective, it is prejudicial against the employee.
A number of reasons may explain why a system, fraught with so much error, has survived for almost half a century. However, it is the following reason that has compelled me to write this short paper. As one jurist aptly observes, grievance resolution in the public sector is a topic of study that has been neglected by academics. "While there have been some descriptions of rights arbitration in the public sector, there has been little in the way of analysis of the process and jurisprudence."
9 It is my hope that this paper will initiate a meaningful dialogue not only in academic circles, but more importantly within the Government of Canada and the federal public do so. Accordingly, the expected outcomes of the grievance procedure, as administered in the private sector, cannot be achieved. In part three, I examine the government's obligations to administer its grievance procedure in a manner congruent to the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. In examining these principles, I turn to Canada's quasi-constitutional statute, as well as the common law in order to inform my analysis. I argue that because of the government's dual role, it is inherently biased and should be disqualified from taking decisions unilaterally. In part four, I examine what I coin to be "residual problems" in the grievance procedure. Among other things, I argue that because of the government's status as an administrative decision-maker, the grievance procedure essentially duplicates the work of the Public Service Labour Relations Board. In part five, I provide three alternatives to the model currently used by the government. All three alternatives offer conflict resolution through a procedurally fair process. Finally, I conclude by reiterating that the current system for grievance resolution in the federal public service is inadequate. If administered correctly and with a view to administrative law principles, the system is inherently biased against the employee. Adopting an effective alternative approach will not only save the government money, it will also promote harmonious industrial relations.
II. The Grievance Procedure
It is no surprise that the grievance process has become an integral part of the modern day collective bargaining regime. After all, "before the advent of collective bargaining, grievances were disposed of on the employer's terms, if not also at [its] Relations Act 16 are almost silent on the issue. They merely refer to a procedure in a number of different contexts. Thus, while the private sector grievance model provides a framework from which to work, the procedure adopted from workplace to workplace will depend entirely upon the negotiated text of each bargaining unit's collective agreement. That being the case, most grievance procedures operate in a multi-step fashion, and specify, for example, the: types of issues that may grieved; timeframes in which a grievance may be filed; and the classes of persons that are entitled to file. It is important to note that the flexibility in this process is geared towards resolving disputes in a collaborative and informal environment. In order to foster collaboration, the proceedings are most often confidential. Confidentiality is viewed as an important factor that influences the participants' trust and confidence in the integrity of the system. 17 Moreover, to encourage bilateral collaboration, participants must agree not to use any information gained during the process in any external forum, such as arbitration.
A typical grievance procedure, as found in the private sector, comprises four key levels or steps.
The first level consists of two stages. First, the aggrieved employee, with or without the union steward present, discusses his or her complaint with the first-line supervisor. At this stage, the goal is to resolve the problem as quickly and as informally as possible. However, if manager and employee are unable to reach agreement, the complaint is reduced to writing. Once submitted to management, it technically becomes a grievance. Within the timeframe specified in the collective agreement, management issues a decision, which may be challenged by the union steward or the grievant at the next level.
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At the second level, the grievance is presented to an industrial relations representative (designated by management) by the union steward or, in some cases, a member of the grievance committee. The committee is typically comprised of the local union president or his or her designate, the chief steward, and usually one or two elected members. At this stage, the participants are very familiar with the collective agreement and with grievance precedent.
Decisions on second-level grievances are rendered in writing by the industrial relations representative, and challenges to that decision must be made within the specified timeframe.
Grievances that are taken to third level most often involve issues that have precedent-setting ramifications, major cost implications, or broad application with the company's operations. Due to the importance of these grievances, additional management and union personnel are added to the deliberations, including the industrial relations manager and other management officials, such as a general foreman or plant superintendent, along with high-level union officials.
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If a grievance is not resolved, it can be submitted to a neutral third party-an arbitrator, who hears evidence from both sides and renders a decision, which is final and binding upon the The grievance procedure used by the federal public service bears a remarkable resemblance to that used by the private sector. After all, it should, the public service grievance procedure takes its roots in industry. 24 The most notable similarity between the two procedures is its structure.
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Akin to the private sector, the Government of Canada has adopted a multi-step grievance process. However, despite the appearance of an almost identical system, there are a few key distinctions. Unlike the process negotiated in the private sector, the public sector grievance procedure is almost entirely legislated-leaving the government and the unions with very little to 20 Ibid. unions include provisions relating to the grievance procedure, they address the less substantive and more procedurally-focussed aspects of the process. For the most part, the agreements restate the issues outlined in the Act and Regulations, which include but are not limited to the: types of issues that can be grieved; process for referring a grievance to adjudication; and the binding effects of grievance decisions on the parties. This difference has a profound effect on the goals and outcomes of the process. For starters, the process is no longer party-owned. The government unilaterally imposes its wishes and power on the unions and employees-eliminating an element of flexibility both at the bargaining table and during the grievance process.
Moreover, the system that the government has created carves out a unique and untenable position for management. Because management is also the government, it becomes, de facto, an "administrative decision-maker," making the process more akin to arbitration. The process is, more often than not, administered in a hearing-like manner, and often by an unqualified manager or labour relations advisor. Accordingly, the process changes from a collaborative to an adversarial model. Instead of working together to devise solutions, management and the employee are working against each other in their own interests-further creating distance between each other and adding a layer of unneeded and undesired formality. dual also role raises serious issues of procedural fairness; I will address these issues in the section that follows.
The formal qualities of the public sector grievance procedure extend beyond the four walls of the room in which the grievance is being heard. Unlike the informal document used to file a grievance in the private sector, the language of which can be quite loose, the "Federal Court has not been as lenient in allowing [grievants] latitude in drafting their grievances.
[Grievants] are, instead, expected to be fairly specific in stating the grounds on which they are basing their grievances (as well as the remedy sought)." 29 This distinction is important because it means that it would be wise for the public sector grievant to seek qualified counsel, legal or other, in drafting his or her grievance. Further, because not every grievance that is filed may be referred to adjudication, it is even more important that the grievance be well-crafted. In fact, section 209 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act considerably limits the Public Service Labour Relations
Board's jurisdiction to matters relating to the interpretation or application of a provision of the grievant's collective agreement, and some forms of disciplinary action. 30 Thus, the employee is barred from bringing a claim to the Board with respect to the application of any piece of federal legislation, or policy issued by the Government of Canada-of which there are hundreds.
Employees are also expressly prohibited from commencing a civil action against the government. The Public Service Labour Relations Act rids an employee of the right to sue the government in court, and grants an employee the right to grieve in its very own form of kangaroo court in its stead. 31 The grave implications of this provision are even more reason for an employee to have expert counsel, and for the appropriate procedural protections built into the grievance process.
The final level of the public sector model also resembles the final level of the private sector process. However, instead of the matter being referred to a private, third-party arbitrator, the grievance may, in some instances, be referred to the Public Service Labour Relations Board. The
Board is independent of management, and like most other labour relations boards, the Public Service Labour Relations Board has a strong privative clause embedded in its constituent legislation. Thus, a court will rarely be inclined to overturn a decision taken by the Board.
It is also important to note that in addition to the formal process itself, "there is a bewildering array of mechanisms for resolving disputes between individuals and the employer." 32 As I will discuss in greater detail below, the Public Service Labour Relations Act requires every deputy head to institute an "informal conflict management system." 33 However, the Act provides no guidance as to what the system should comprise. The result is a complex system that is often poorly administered and difficult to understand.
III. Management's plight as administrative decision-maker in the federal public service grievance procedure
The Government of Canada plays a unique role in the administration of its grievance procedure.
It not only acts as legislator and management, but also as administrative decision-maker. In other words, the government becomes a quasi-judicial body "before which, a matter may be heard or tried, as distinguished from a purely executive agency." 34 Section 214 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act carves out this distinctly unique role for the government. It reads:
If an individual grievance has been presented up to and including the final level in the grievance process and it is not one that under section 209 may be referred to adjudication, the decision on the grievance taken at the final level in the grievance process is final and binding for all purposes of this Act and no further action under this Act may be taken on it.
If section 214 reads like a privative clause, that is because it is. Although on its face, this section does not explicitly provide the government with administrative decision-making status, it does suggest that the decision taken on the grievance at the final level of the procedure will be insulated from review by the judiciary. 35 This type of clause is a common feature in legislation establishing administrative boards and tribunals, and is, in fact, unique to such bodies. So while Parliament had intended to limit judicial interference in the government's grievance procedure through the phrase "final and binding," it conferred administrative decision-making power to management, at the same time. As a result, the procedural protections that apply to all administrative bodies under statute and at common law must also apply throughout every stage of the federal public service grievance process.
Among other things, administrative agencies must act with fairness, impartiality, and adjudicative independence; and now, so too must management. In this section, I will examine the role of these principles, as applied to the public sector grievance procedure, under the Canadian Bill of Rights, 36 and at common law. Although they aim to protect the sanctity of an administrative process, they inevitably work counter to the principles of flexibility and S.C. 1960, c. 44. collaboration that underpin the private sector grievance process. Thus, while management is required to be unbiased, fair, and independent in its decision-making process, it rarely adheres to such requirements-leaving the grievant in an untenable situation. If management, on the one hand, administers the grievance procedure according to the private sector model's principles of flexibility and collaboration, the grievant is denied his or her due process rights. On the other hand, if management administers the process in accordance with the administrative law principles noted above, the grievant is robbed of the benefits of a collaborative and informal grievance procedure. And even if the grievance procedure were administered in a manner akin to an administrative tribunal, it is impossible for government, in its management capacity, to remain unbiased and independent. The result is unsatisfactory for all parties. If management is the sole decision-maker on any number of issues that may be grieved, it will be inherently biased. In other words, it will be impossible for one manager to render an unbiased decision relating to an act or omission of another member of the management team, because that manager will always have an unequivocal interest in the case being tried. Therefore, management's decision at every level of the grievance procedure should be declared invalid for want of an impartial adjudicator.
a. Due process and fairness accorded by the Canadian Bill of Rights
Moreover, in order for a process to be conducted in a procedurally-fair manner, parties have to be apprised of the exact manner in which the process is to be conducted. As such, most adjudicative bodies issue rules of procedure or practice. 38 This not only provides parties and their counsel with advance guidance as to how the proceeding will unfold, but it ensures standardization and predictability from proceeding to proceeding. As I will discuss below, at present, even if one department or agency were to institute such rules, there is no requirement for another department or agency to issue the same-if it issues them at all. Therefore, the grievant is unlikely to know how the procedure will be adjudicated until the time of adjudication. This clearly falls short of the fair procedural requirements espoused by the Canadian Bill of Rights.
b. Bias and independence
In addition to the Bill of Rights, the common law also imposes a duty of fairness on adjudicative decision-makers. This duty requires the decision-maker to perform his or her function "free both from material interest in the outcome, and from bias or reasonable apprehension from it." 39 As noted above, the government has an inherent interest in the outcome of every grievance that appears before it. Because the government is both management and decision-maker, it is impossible to separate its interests from the process, at least under the present model. Indeed, "an administrative decision-maker who is an employee or officer of a party is likely to be disqualified for reasonable apprehension of bias on the ground of pecuniary interest or lack of independence." And, "where a decision-maker is in the position of reviewing a decision made earlier by his superior, a reasonable apprehension of bias will also be found." 40 The common law is clear, if not explicit, on this issue. All employers, including the government, are unable to render an unbiased decision relating to its employees; hence the independence requirements of the third-party arbitrator in the private sector grievance model, and the Public Service Labour
Relations Board in the public sector procedure.
The maxim "nemo judex in causa sua" need also be applied to all adjudicative decision-makers at common law. It stipulates that no one shall be a judge in his or her own cause and "encompasses both a decision-maker who has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of a decision and a non-pecuniary interest in a particular outcome." 41 Although the government may not, in every instance, have a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the process, it will, by virtue of its dual role, always have non-pecuniary one. However, there are many circumstances in which the government will have a pecuniary interest, as many grievances are filed because of a dispute over some financial benefit. For these reasons alone, the government, as adjudicative decisionmaker, cannot fulfill its common law duties. I agree and conclude that it is a principle of natural justice that a party should receive a hearing before a tribunal which is not only independent, but also appears independent. Where a party has a reasonable apprehension of bias, it should not be required to submit to the tribunal giving rise to this apprehension. Moreover, the principles for judicial independence outlined in Valente are applicable in the case of an administrative tribunal, where the tribunal is functioning as an adjudicative body settling disputes and determining the rights of the parties.
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The Government of Canada does not, at present, afford management any semblance of financial security, or security of tenure. Accordingly, managers in a decision-making capacity may feel compelled to render a decision in favour of the government. Moreover, it is very conceivable for the decision-maker to be influenced either by his or her superiors or colleagues. Thus, the standard of institutional independence required of the judiciary cannot be met.
And, "where a tribunal does not satisfy the standard of institutional independence, every member will be disqualified from adjudicating a dispute." 44 Of course, if the statute itself establishes the tribunal's relationship with the government, and its terms of reference, the lack of institutional independence will not invalidate the tribunal's decisions unless it conflicts with the quasiconstitutional guarantee of the right to a fair hearing before an impartial and independent decision-maker. 45 provision, and therefore the government cannot be relieved of its common law duty to provide a hearing that is independent.
c. Reasons
The specific content of "procedural fairness" and "due process" in Canada has been formulated through interpretations of the common law, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 46 and the Bill of Rights to include reasons for a decision. Writing for a majority in the watershed case Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , L'Heureux-Dubé, J. held that:
Reasons, it has been argued, foster better decision making by ensuring that issues and reasoning are well articulated and, therefore, more carefully thought out. The process of writing reasons for decision by itself may be a guarantee of a better decision. Reasons also allow parties to see that the applicable issues have been carefully considered, and are invaluable if a decision is to be applied, questioned, or considered on judicial review. Those affected may be more likely to feel they were treated fairly and appropriately if reasons are given. that the manager will have no experience drafting reasons. This invites unnecessary error into a process already fraught with it.
IV. Residual problems with the public service grievance procedure
Aside from the procedural concerns, discussed above, a number of other issues give rise to the federal public service's ineffective grievance process. Although these issues are residual to the more serious and pressing concerns of fairness and natural justice, they too impact the effectiveness of the process.
a. Lack of standardization
The birth of "public service modernization" conferred an unparalleled level of autonomy upon deputy heads of federal departments and agencies. In response to the recommendations made by the Auditor General in the year 2000, 48 Parliament had aimed to streamline human resources governance through the enactment of the Public Service Modernization Act. 49 Along with several other changes, the Act shifted accountability for the grievance process from the Treasury Board Secretariat to the deputy heads of the some 200 departments and agencies that comprise Canada's federal government. While the shift was intended to institute what was a greatlyneeded sense of efficiency, it did not come without its own problems. Indeed, the shift of accountability no longer meant that the grievance procedure would be standardized from department to department. Of course, the process is, to some degree, standardized for the text of the Public Service Labour Relations Act and regulations thereto provide uniformity. However, the manner in which departments and their staffs approach the procedure can differ significantly.
At first glance, this shift would appear to conform to the principle of flexibility espoused by the private sector grievance model. A deeper analysis, however, yields otherwise. Because deputy heads can issue their own policies and directives with respect to the administration of the grievance procedure, it is not inconceivable for some departments to institute a policy to deny claims without attending to their merits. Such polices would go relatively unnoticed because very little data is collected about the administration of the grievance procedure in the federal public service. 50 This undoubtedly raises many of the same issues of fairness and bias that I addressed, above. It also raises issues of fairness in another context. If public servants of the same bargaining unit are employed at different departments, as many are, should they not be entitled to be treated (and have their grievances administered) in a like manner? The answer is obvious: yes.
In fact, while the Public Service Modernization Act accords deputy heads with great deal of autonomy and flexibility in the administration of the public service grievance procedure, they are contractually obligated, under the various collective agreements, to administer the process uniformly. Not only is this a legitimate expectation, it is the purpose of collective bargaining.
Having a centralized policy or community of practice helps to ensure that the grievance procedure is administered in a uniform and fair manner. A centralized body would also be wellsuited to collect relevant data on the grievance procedure, so that it may respond to the types of procedural issues that have been identified throughout this paper.
Moreover, under the public service grievance system, a decentralized procedure invites the possibility of conflicting decisions on similar issues. While the common law principle of stare decisis is not observed by most Canadian labour tribunals, the Public Service Commission Advisory Council's Working Group on Recourse notes that like cases should be treated alike.
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As it stands, the grievance decisions that are issued by management in the some 200 departments and agencies are confidential and are therefore not published. Thus, there is no way of ensuring consistency in management decision-making at any level during the grievance procedure.
Publishing decisions would not only provide precedential value but would also provide predictability and standardization in an otherwise incongruent system.
b. Access to information
An aggrieved party wishing to build his or her case can seek information from the government in two ways. First, he or she can request the information through the appropriate channels.
However, in many instances, the grievant is unlikely to do so, either for fear of reprisal, or of escalating the conflict. And, because the grievance system is adversarial, the department or agency in which the grievant is employed may not wish to disclose the information requested. It is important to note that the government has no obligation to disclose any information via this route.
Of course, the aggrieved party can also submit an access to information and privacy request 
c. Duplication of process
The structure of the public service grievance procedure lends itself to duplication. Given that it operates in a quasi-judicial nature, it is questionable whether, under the current system, the Unfortunately, adjudication is not the only point at which the grievance procedure is duplicated.
Indeed, given the requirement stipulated in the Public Service Labour Relations Act for every deputy head to implement an informal conflict management system, it is very possible for the grievance procedure to be overtaken at points much earlier than the adjudicative process. The informal conflict management system aims to "prevent conflict escalation by managing and resolving conflicts in the workplace quickly and constructively." 57 This means, that among other things, management and employee are encouraged to resolve its differences through any number of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as bilateral discussion, and grievance mediation. Although these forms of alternative dispute resolution should be integrated into an effective grievance procedure, it is unclear if they are. As the Fryer Report notes, the system is complex and confusing for the government to administer and the grievant to use. So it would appear very possible for the government's complex informal conflict management system to duplicate the grievance procedure.
V. Alternatives
As I have noted above, the Government of Canada finds itself in a unique and precarious position in the administration of its grievance procedure. If management administers the procedure according to the principles of natural justice and fairness, required by law, the process essentially duplicates the work of the Public Service Labour Relations Board. The employee is robbed of an opportunity and the benefit to own the process and resolve the conflict informally, at least in this setting. If management conducts the grievance procedure in accordance with the values espoused by the private sector model, i.e. flexibility and collaboration, then it circumvents key procedural requirements. In either case, the grievance process is ineffective. In this section, I 
a. A truly informal process
The obvious alternative to the current model is to administer the grievance procedure as it was meant to be administered-in an informal and collaborative setting. Management's administrative decision-making status should be removed by eliminating the privative clause in the Public Service Labour Relations Act. Furthermore, the exclusivity clause should also be removed so that all matters that may be grieved may also be subject to adjudication. Such action will facilitate a process akin to the private sector model. It will provide the grievant with an opportunity to resolve his or her complaint through informal means. If that process is unsuccessful, the grievant can have his or her complaint heard in front of a fair and independent tribunal. The necessity to publish decisions, issued at the various level of the grievance procedure, would be eliminated because the process would be working in a collaborative and flexible manner. Most importantly, the government need not act with formality and rigor, as the process does not require it to act in accordance with the quasi-constitutional and common law principles of fairness and natural justice. This alternative is truly the grievance procedure in its purest form.
b. Tripartite model
However, given the shoddy manner in which the grievance procedure has been administered over the years, some sceptics may be critical of management's ability to embrace such an alternative. Where the function of the decision-maker is essentially adjudicative or judicial in nature, the bias requirements will be akin to those applied to judges. Nevertheless, even with this broad classification, some accommodation must be made for variations in the adjudicative process, perhaps the most familiar being the use of tripartite tribunals in connection with grievance arbitrations, the administration of labour relations regulator legislation and employment equity regimes. In these contexts, a degree of partisanship is to be expected, employer nominees bring a particular point of view to the issues, as do employee and union nominees. Indeed, in the design of the tribunal, it is the neutral chairman who provides the requisite impartiality, although all member of the board are expected to "act judicially" and to make their decisions fairly, that is upon the evidence and argument of the parties.
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The tripartite model offers both flexibility and fairness for the government and the grievant. The government could, for example, establish a roster of adjudicators, thus allowing managers to perform their primary functions while gaining valuable experience for the proper administration of the grievance procedure. And, if the union contributes to selecting the Chair, the grievant would be assured that the process was conducted with absolute impartiality and fairness.
59 Supra note 39 at 11-14.
c. A properly administered administrative process
Finally, the Government of Canada could administer the grievance process as an adjudicative body should, with the requisite procedural protections espoused by the Canadian Bill of Rights, and at common law. Grievance decisions and reasons for the decisions should be published-if not for precedential value than to ensure accountability. A requirement relating to the expertise of the adjudicative decision-maker should reflect that required of the Public Service Labour
Relations Board. The Board should act as an appellate body so that its work is not duplicated by the grievance process. Furthermore, the Board should still hear matters that are not amenable to adjudication under the grievance process. This solution would require the least amount of work for both the government and the public sector unions to implement. Although a minor amendment would be required to grant the Public Service Labour Relations Board with the proposed appellate jurisdiction, the only real work required would be to educate management on its proper role and responsibility in conducting an adjudicative hearing.
VI. Conclusion
Conflict is an inevitable part of every workplace; and because it is, every workplace should have an effective mechanism for resolving it. For nearly half a century, the Government of Canada has been administering a grievance system that has been widely criticized for its complexity and infectiveness. If the process is properly administered, and in accordance with the principles of fairness and natural justice, it is incapable of having a positive influence on such labourmanagement outcomes as productivity and product quality. Its formal, adversarial qualities create distance between the grievant and management, and contradict the values espoused by the private sector grievance procedure. If the process is administered according to those values, the grievant is denied his or her due process rights. In either case, the public sector grievance system falls short of achieving what was envisaged in 1967, and what is expected by every grievant today: A fair and constructive forum for settling rights-based disputes.
Despite the number of recommendations made to rectify the system's shortcomings, the Government of Canada has done little to effect any change. Reasonable and effective alternatives are indeed available to correct the systemic problems inherent in the process. And until one such alternative is adopted, the government will continue to administer its grievance process in a manner reminiscent of a time when the doctrine of sovereignty ruled the day.
